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FLORIDA BOARD OF MEDICINE RESISTS CHANGE
MARSHALL R. BURACK*
During the 1990's, the health care industry has been experiencing
revolutionary changes. The growth of managed care, the consolidation of
physician practices, and the development and growth of physician practice
management companies have spurred the creation of new economic
arrangements and alliances, as providers, payors, and managers struggle to
survive and prosper in a changing health care environment. In the face of
decreasing payments from managed care payors, health care providers are
constantly seeking new sources of revenue and new ways to expand their
patient base.
The economic arrangements which providers enter into to achieve these
objectives often raise questions under federal and state anti-fraud and abuse
laws, prohibitions against fee splitting, and prohibitions against "selfreferrals." In the State of Florida, the Florida Board of Medicine is often
called upon to issue a Declaratory Statement as to whether a particular
economic arrangement is in compliance with applicable provisions of Florida
law.' The questions posed to the Board of Medicine in various requests for
Declaratory Statements often involve a tension between innovative new ways
to structure delivery of health care services in a changing health care industry
and established prohibitions against fee-splitting, self-referral and other
practices which are often associated with over-utilization of health care
services. In weighing these competing values, the Board of Medicine has
generally followed the more conservative road, favoring traditional ways of
doing business and ruling that various new economic arrangements are in
violation of applicable law.
The Florida Board of Medicine is one of several regulatory boards within
the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation which are
responsible for regulating the practice of various professions. The Board of
Medicine consists of 15 members, 12 of whom must be licensed physicians.
Although the principal function of the Board of Medicine is to review and
Mr. Burack is a shareholder in the law firn of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A. His practice
is primarily in the area of health care law, representing physicians, ambulatory surgery centers, imaging
centers and other provider entities. He is a graduate of Princeton University and the Harvard Law School.
I
Section 120.565 of the Florida Statutes provides that each agency shall provide by rule a
procedure for the filing and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory statements as to the applicability
of a specified statutory provision or rule to a particular set of facts. Although a declaratory statement
applies only to the petitioner and the particular facts presented, the declaratory statements are published and
put parties on notice as to how the agency or board issuing the statement interprets a particular statute or
rule.
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adjudicate complaints against physicians alleging professional malpractice or
other violations of the Medical Practice Act,2 the Board of Medicine is also
responsible for enforcing various provisions of the Medical Practice Act
relating to the business of practicing medicine. Such provisions include,
among others, the prohibition against "paying or receiving any commission,
bonus, kick-back or rebate, or engaging in any split fee arrangement ...
for
patients referred to providers of health care goods and services.3 In the past
several years, the Board has issued several orders, in response to requests for
Declaratory Statements, declaring illegal certain business practices and
relationships which have been developed by providers and practice
management companies in response to changes in the health care industry.
Seeking to prevent or delay changes in the way the business of health care is
conducted, the Board has relied upon broad interpretations of Florida's
statutory prohibitions against fee-splitting and kick-backs in declaring its
disapproval of certain business arrangements.
Perhaps the most significant of the Board's recent decisions is Inre: The
Petitionfor DeclaratoryStatement of Magan L. Bakarania,M.D., issued by
the Board on November 3, 1997. Inthis Order, the Board declared that the
payment by a physician group practice of a management fee equal to a
percentage of the group's net income violates Florida's prohibition against
fee-splitting.
In recent years, as physician practices have consolidated and grown in
size, many physicians have turned to physician practice management
companies to manage their practices and provide various other services. A
wide range of compensation arrangements have been developed in connection
with the provision of practice management services. In many instances, a
physician group will pay its management company a percentage of the group's
revenues or profits as consideration for management services provided by the
company.
Dr. Bakarania is a Florida licensed physician who was considering joining
a group practice which had recently entered into a long-term management
agreement with Phymatrix Practice Management Company, a national practice
management company.'
Pursuant to the management agreement, the
management company was to provide general management services, including
but not limited to "practice expansion" services. The practice expansion
services included creating a physician-provider network, developing
relationships and affiliations with other specialists, hospitals, networks,

2

FLA. STAT. ch.458 (1997)

3

FLA. STAT. § 458.331(1)(i) (1997).

4

20 FALR 395 (Nov. 3, 1997).
Id.

5
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HMOs and PPOs, developing and providing ancillary services,
and evaluating,
6
negotiating and administering managed care contracts.
As consideration for providing the specified management and practice
expansion services, the management company would receive a management
fee consisting of three separate components: (1) an operations fee equal to the
company's actual out-of-pocket expenses for providing operational services;
(2) a fixed annual fee, to compensate the company for providing general
management services; and (3) a performance fee, equal to 30% of the group's
net income.' Dr. Bakarania sought the Board's guidance as to whether the
proposed compensation arrangement was in violation of the prohibition
against fee-splitting, set forth in Section 458.331 (1)(i) of the Florida Statutes.'
That section prohibits the "paying or receiving of any commission, bonus,
kick-back or rebate, or engaging in any split-fee arrangement, in any form
whatsoever with a physician, organization, agency or person, either directly
or indirectly, for patients referred to providers of health care goods and
services."
In its Order, the Board ruled that the payment of a performance fee which
is equal to a percentage of the physicians' net income and which is payable
without regard to the cost of the management services provided is a split-fee
arrangement in violation of Florida law.9 The Board found that the
management company's practice expansion activities helped generate
referrals, and that the payment of fees based on revenues generated by these
referrals violated the prohibition against fee-splitting."0 In its decision, the
Board was not influenced by the fact that the proposed compensation structure
is widely used, in Florida and elsewhere across the country, and is an essential
element of the business relationship between practice management companies
and the practices which they manage."
In its decision, the Board sought to distinguish the Bakarania situation
from the management agreements examined in a line of judicial decisions in
Florida which hold that percentage fee payments to management companies

6

7

Id. at 398-99.
id. at 396-97

9 Inmost requests for Declaratory Statement, the petitioner is seeking a statement that a particular
arrangement or transaction does not violate applicable statutes or regulations. In this particular instance,
however, the physician group practice which Dr. Bakarania was planning to join was seeking to terminate
its contractual relationship with Phymatrix. Thus, Dr. Bakarania was actually seeking a statement from the
Board of Medicine to the effect that the subject management agreement was in violation of Florida law, and
was, therefore, void or voidable.
9

In re Bakarania,20 FAIR at 398.

10

Id.

II

Id.
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do not violate the fee-splitting prohibition. 2 According to the Board, the
management agreements in the prior cases did not expressly require the
management company to expand the physicians' practices or provide
additional referrals of patients.' 3 The Board concluded that the practice
expansion activities performed by Phymatrix were equivalent to making
referrals to the practice, and that payment of a fee for the practice expansion
services based upon the practice's income amounts to prohibited feesplitting. 4 The Board ignored the previously-accepted distinction between
direct referrals from one provider to another provider, and practice expansion
and network development activities which may develop additional business
but do not result in referrals of specific patients.
Although the Board stated that its ruling was limited to the facts presented
in the Petition for Declaratory Statement, and the decision was not intended
to be construed as an absolute prohibition against percentage fees in physician
practice management agreements, 5 it is difficult to determine from the
decision what types of percentage arrangements would be permissible. It is
possible that, in future management agreements, the management company
could be compensated in different ways for the various services it provides.
For example, the management company could receive a percentage-based fee
for administrative management services and a flat fee for practice expansion
and network development activities. This structure apparently would not
violate the statutory provision against fee-splitting, as interpreted by the Board
in Bakarania.
The Bakarania decision casts a cloud of uncertainty over the physician
practice management business in Florida, raising doubts about the legality of
many existing and proposed management contracts. According to persons
associated with the practice management industry, a number of significant
transactions were deferred, restructured or abandoned as a result of the
Bakaraniadecision. Although not all physicians regard practice management
companies favorably, such companies have provided valuable services and
resources tb many physician practices, and a management fee based on a
percentage of revenues or income is usually an essential part of the contractual
arrangement between the parties.

12

See e.g., Practice Management Associates v. Orman, 614 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993);

Practice Management Associates v. Gulley, 618 So.2d 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Practice Management
Associates, Inc. v. Bitet, 654 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). These cases, which are cited at note 4 of the
BakaraniaDeclaratory Statement, involve language in Florida's Chiropractic Practice Act which is virtually
identical to the language set forth in section 458.331(l)(i) (1999) of the Florida Statutes.
13
In re Bakarania, 20 FAIR at 398.
14
Id. at 399.
Is

Id.
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The Board's decision in Bakaraniawas appealed to the District Court of
Appeals by Phymatrix, and the Board agreed to stay its decision pending the
outcome of the appeal. On June 25, 1999, the First District Court of Appeal
affirmed the Board of Medicine's Order, stating, in a one paragraph per
curiam opinion, that, because the appellant had not shown that the Board's
interpretation of the law is "clearly erroneous," the Board's decision must be
affirmed. 6
In November, 1997, when the Board issued its Order in Bakarania, the
physician practice management industry was growing rapidly. As the spread
of managed care threatened to erode physicians' patient bases and reduce fees,
many physicians were being enticed to sell their practices to practice
management companies which promised to reduce operating costs by
managing practices more efficiently, and to create countervailing market
power to negotiate favorable contracts with managed care companies. The
practice management companies also offered the possibility of windfall
investment gains. Many physicians received stock in the management
company as part of the consideration for the sale of their practice, and, based
upon the favorable valuations Wall Street was according to these companies,
physicians expected significant appreciation in the value of their stock. These
expectations were dashed in 1998, when severe problems started appearing in
the practice management industry, as many companies failed to provide
competent management services, and did not produce promised cost savings
and revenue increases. The market value of many publicly-traded
management companies plummeted. Several practice management companies
filed for bankruptcy protection, and other companies, including Phymatrix,
announced plans to abandon the physician practice management business
entirely, to concentrate on other health care business activities.
At approximately the same time the Board's Order in Bakarania was
affirmed, the Board issued its Final Order In re: The Petitionfor Declaratory
Statement of Rew, Rogers & Silver, M.D. 's, P.A. 7 In this Order, the Board
reaffirmed prior orders which found that a percentage management fee did not
necessarily violate the prohibition against fee-splitting if the management
company was not responsible for generating referrals.
The Board
distinguished the case presented from the facts in Bakarania,finding that the
management company managing the Rew, Rogers medical practice was not
responsible for expanding or growing the practice. Further, the percentage fee
was capped at a maximum of $10,000 per month, thus capping the
16

Phymatrix Management Co., Inc. v. Bakarania, 24 Fla. L Weekly. D1500 (Fla. 1st DCA June

25, 1999).
17

As of August 20, 1999, the Board had approved the draft Final Order, but the Order had not yet

been signed or filed with the Department of Health.
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management company's incentive to grow the practice. The Board held that,
under these circumstances, the percentage management fee did not violate the
fee-splitting provision. The Board did not specifically indicate whether the
monthly fee cap was essential to its decision, or whether it was sufficient that
the management company was not obligated to generate additional patients for
the managed practice. In either event, this recent ruling indicates that the
Board is not completely averse to the changing financial arrangements which
are occurring in the medical industry, and the ruling should provide some
measure of relief to practice management companies which receive a
percentage of the managed group's income as all or part of their management
fee.
Two other Orders issued by the Board in 1997, although having a
narrower impact than Bakarania,also demonstrate the Board's reluctance to
accept new economic arrangements involving physicians who are seeking
ways to adapt to and prosper in the changing health care economic
environment.
On November 3, 1997, the same day it issued its Order in Bakarania,the
Board also issued its Final Order In re: The Petition for Declaratory
Statement of Jeffrdy Fernyhough, M.D.'8 Dr. Fernyhough sought the Board's
guidance with respect to his proposal to lease "prime" counter space in his
office to a mail-order pharmacy, for the installation of the pharmacy's
computer terminal. Utilizing the computer terminal, Dr. Fernyhough's
patients could order medications prescribed by the doctor and would receive
them the next day by overnight mail delivery. The computer would contain
relevant patient data (which would be entered by the doctor's administrative
staff), and the computer's sophisticated software would enable the doctor to
determine whether. any prescribed medication would cause an adverse
interaction or be duplicative of any other prescribed medication. The presence
of the computer terminal in the doctor's office would also provide increased
convenience for patients in ordering and obtaining prescribed medications.
Patients would not be required to use the mail-order pharmacy for obtaining
prescribed medications, and all patients would be advised of their right to
obtain medication from the pharmacy of their choice. 9
The pharmacy proposed to enter into a written agreement with the doctor
pursuant to which the pharmacy would pay the doctor rent for lease of the
counter space and reimburse the doctor for administrative services performed
by the doctor's staff in connection with inputting patient data into the
computer. The rental payments were asserted to be consistent with the fair

is
9

20 FALR 4381 (Fla. Bd. of Medicine 1997).
Id. at 4382

1999]

FLORIDA BOARD OF MEDICINE RESISTS CHANGE

491

market value of the counter space being leased and with the cost of
administrative personnel, as determined in an arm's length transaction, and
would not be determined in a manner which takes into account the volume or
value of any referrals or business generated between the doctor and the
pharmacy. °
The Board refused to accept the doctor's representations that the fair
market value of the prime counter space in his office could be determined in
such a manner as to avoid the doctor receiving a windfall from the lease of a
few feet of counter space. The Board found that the arrangement is "simply
put, a scheme to allow pharmacy to pay Petitioner in return for providing
referrals to the pharmacy in violation of Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida
Statutes." In making its ruling, the Board apparently did not consider
potential benefits to patients arising from the presence of the pharmacy's
computer terminal in the doctor's office, or the advances in computer
technology which may support changes in the traditional relationships
between physicians and pharmacies.
The Board's Final Order In re: The PetitionforDeclaratoryStatementof
George G. Levy, M.D., issued on May 2, 1997, represents another refusal by
the Board to accept non-traditional economic relationships involving
physicians.2' In his medical practice, Dr. Levy had the need to order, from
time to time, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies for his patients. Dr.
Levy sought to facilitate the prompt and efficient provision of MRI scans for
his patients by engaging a qualified radiologist physician as a part-time
employee, to interpret MRI scans performed for Dr. Levy's patients by an
independent MRI center. The MRI center would perform the scans on Dr.
Levy's patients and provide Dr. Levy with the MRI films, for interpretation
by Dr. Levy's radiologist employee. Dr. Levy would utilize information
contained in the radiologist's report to treat his patients. The MRI center
would bill the patient's insuror for the "technical" portion of the scan. Dr.
Levy's office would bill the patient's insuror for the "professional" portion or
the interpretation. Dr. Levy would pay his radiologist employee on a "perread" basis, paying him a specific amount for each interpretation. To the
extent collections with respect to the professional component of the MRI
service exceeded the per-read fees paid by Dr. Levy to his radiologist
employee, Dr. Levy would retain the difference.
The Board ruled that Dr. Levy's retention of any portion of the
professional fees billed for reading and interpreting scans and studies
performed on his patients without Dr. Levy actually performing any

20
21

Id. at 4383.
Final Order # AHCA-97-0495 (1997).
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professional service is a "split-fee arrangement," in violation of Section
458.33 1(1)(i) of the Florida Statutes. In reaching this restrictive result, the
Board apparently ignored the employer-employee relationship between Dr.
Levy and the radiologist, ruling, in effect, that referrals from an employer to
an employee will be subject to the same scrutiny as referrals between separate
entities, and that an employer may not retain a portion of the revenue
generated from services provided by his employee to referred patients.
On the other hand, the conservative result reached by the Board in In re:
The Petitionfor DeclaratoryStatement ofAlan Levin, M.D. and Ameripath,
Inc.22, which dealt primarily with the Florida Patient Self-Referral Act of
1992, 23 is consistent with applicable law, and the Board did not have to rely
on an overboard interpretation of the statutory language to reach its
conservative result. This case involved a proposal by Ameripath to provide
pathologists to groups of dermatologist physicians, on a part-time basis,
pursuant to independent contractor and employee leasing arrangements, so
that the dermatology groups could provide clinical laboratory and pathology
services for the groups' patients. The consideration to be paid by such groups
to Ameripath would be less than the amount which the groups would be
entitled to bill for the pathologists' services.24
The Board found that the proposed arrangements violated the SelfReferral Act. The Self-Referral Act prohibits a health care provider from
referring patients for the provision of certain "designated health services"
(including, among others, clinical laboratory services) to an entity in which
the referring provider is an investor.25 The referral of patients to the
pathologist for clinical laboratory services, and the fact that the dermatology
group billed for the pathologist's professional services; triggers the
prohibitions of the Self-Referral Act.
The Self-Referral Act contains an exception from the basic prohibition for
referrals by a member of a group practice for services provided solely for the
group's patients and that are provided by or under the direct supervision of
another member of the group.26
The Board properly found that the proposed arrangement did not qualify
for this exception." When the services provided by a part-time pathologist
were considered as part of the services provided by a dermatology group, the
group would not meet the Self-Referral Act's definition of a "group practice."

22

19 FALR 4525 (Fla. Bd. of Medicine 1997).

23

FLA. STAT. §455.236 Fla. Stat. (1992) (renumbered FLA. STAT. § 455.654 (1997)).

24

In re Levin, 19 FALR at 4526.
See id. at 4527.
FLA. STAT. §455.654(3)(k)3.f. (Supp. 1998).
In re Levin, 19 FALR at 4528.

25
26
"
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The statutory definition of a "group practice" requires (i) that each member
of the group provide "substantially the full range of services which the health
care provider routinely provides ... through the use of shared office space,
facilities, equipment and personnel," and (ii) that substantially all of the
services of the health care providers who are members of the group are
provided through the group and are billed in the name of the group." 8
The Board found that, because a pathologist would be providing a limited
range of services for a dermatology group, he would not be providing, on
behalf of the group, the full range of services which he normally provides as
part of his overall practice. Thus the dermatology group would not meet the
first test set forth in the statutory definition. The Board also found that,
because a pathologist would be employed on a part-time basis and would
devote only part of his professional time to providing services through the
dermatology group, in many instances, the requirement that members of the
group provide substantially all of the services provided by such persons
through the group would not be satisfied.29
The prohibitions of the Self-Referral Act are set forth clearly and
explicitly, and allow less room for interpretation than the prohibition against
fee-splitting. The Board's Order in Levin involved the application of a fairly
explicit law to a particular set of facts rather than a determination of the
parameters of a more general law which is subject to varying interpretations.
Curiously, after holding that the proposed arrangements in Levin violated the
Self-Referral Act, the Board also ruled, using rather circular reasoning, that
the arrangements also violated the prohibition against fee-splitting.3"
Florida's statutory prohibitions against fee-splitting and self-referral are
designed to control health care costs by discouraging unnecessary referrals
induced by financial incentives. Proper interpretation and enforcement of
these statutory provisions is essential to maintaining the economic integrity

n

29

FLA. STAT. §455.654(3)(f) (1997).

Noting that the Self-Referral Act did not specifically define the term "substantially all," as that

term relates to services provided by members of the group, The Board noted the similarity of the definition
of "group practice" contained in the "Stark Bill" the federal statute prohibiting self-referrals - and borrowed
the standard established by federal regulators implementing the Stark Bill, which require that at least 75%

of the total patient care services provided by members of a group be furnished through the group.
30

After finding the arrangements violated the Self-Referral Act, the Board stated:
Therefore, to the extent that such referrals would involve

splitting professional fees between the referring entity of
physicians and the Arneripath employed pathologists, such
arrangement would result in a violation of [the statutory
prohibition against fee-splitting], because it would entail a
split-fee arrangement.
19 FALR at 4529.
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of the health care system. The prohibitions should not be interpreted so
broadly, however, so as to thwart innovation and the development of new
relationships or arrangements which may promote efficiency or better or more
convenient service for patients. The Board of Medicine should recognize that
the health care industry is changing rapidly. In reviewing proposed new
economic arrangements, the Board should weigh the benefits which may
accrue to patients and to physicians from such arrangements against the
possibilities of abuse which may be inherent in such relationships.

